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ABSTRACT
Loot boxes are items in video games that contain randomized
prizes that players can purchase with real-world money. In recent
years, loot boxes have come under scrutiny because the
relationship between behavior and the underlying mechanics of
loot boxes are similar to that of addictive behaviors associated
with real-world gambling. Many papers suggest solutions focused
on industry changes without direct regulation. However, these
papers neglect the enormous profit incentive to maintain a
business practice which can have detrimental behavioral effects on
children. The United States federal government must take example
from a growing number of European countries and ban the sale of
loot boxes to children.
Growing concern in the United States has been met with
attempts to regulate loot boxes as gambling. However, the nature
of loot boxes causes them to fall between the cracks in our present
regulatory infrastructure, which is created through state gambling
laws. Common law on what constitutes a prize typically requires
that the item have transferrable value. Game developers restrict
players from selling items gained through loot boxes, so this
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requirement usually cannot be met through state gambling laws or
common law. This paper will examine the Federal Government’s
ability to regulate loot boxes on a national level and propose
model legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, patterns of gambling behavior associated with
video games have become a great concern to legislatures around
the world.1 This paper will primarily focus on regulating loot box
sales to children. As will be shown, children are one of the most
vulnerable consumer groups when it comes to developing
problematic gambling behaviors.
In 2015, Grady Ballard initially only saw small transactions
appear in his credit card statements.2 Grady was infuriated when he
saw twenty-seven charges, which totaled $356.85.3 What he found
out was that his son, Elijah Ballard, racked up these charges in
order to get “skins,” which are custom designs for weapons, in the
video game Counter-strike: Global Offensive. Elijah then used
these skins to engage in a game of chance on a third-party website
in the hopes of winning more valuable skins.4 This activity is a
form of online gambling called skin-betting. What Grady did not
know was that these charges were accrued after Elijah already sold
his iPad in order to purchase two skins worth a combined $900.5
Over time, Elijah was making larger and larger wagers on skinbetting websites, so he needed more and more cash.6
1

Kevin Webb, Regulators from More Than a Dozen Countries Are Looking to
Crack Down on 'Loot Boxes, ' A Controversial Video Gaming Practice that
Could Be Too Much Like Gambling, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2018, 6:49
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/loot-boxes-european-regulation-20189#:~:text=Regulators%20from%20more%20than%20a,be%20too%20much%20
like%20gambling&text=Belgium%20and%20the%20Netherlands%20have,and
%20have%20banned%20the%20practice. See also, Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes:
Gambling for the Next Generation, 46 W. St. L. Rev. 61, 70-71 (2019) (In South
Korea, some members of the National Assembly have proposed amendments to
require that companies disclose the potential prizes and odds of winning. In
China, the government created requirements that companies had to follow in
order to sell loot boxes).
2
Shaun Assael, Skin in the Game, ESPN (Jan. 20, 2017),
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/18510975/how-counter-striketurned-teenager-compulsive-gambler.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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Researchers and regulators are becoming more and more
concerned about loot boxes and the potential harms these virtual
items pose to consumers. Researcher David Zendle defines loot
boxes as “items in video games that may be bought for real-world
money, but which provide players with a randomized reward of
uncertain value.” 7 When players purchase a loot box, “players
have no way of knowing whether it contains a rare and appealing
item, or something else entirely.”8 Players can potentially spend
large sums of money in their pursuit of rarer items. In 2016, Lance
Perkins was stunned when he found $7,625 was charged from his
17-year-old son’s Xbox Live account.9 Perkins gave “his son a
credit card for emergencies or to make purchases for the family’s
convenience store.”10 Instead, the 17-year-old used Perkins’s card
to rack up charges on a game in the FIFA series.11 In FIFA, a
player can purchase a loot box to obtain certain rare players.12 In
2017, Roy Dobson from Lancashire, United Kingdom (“U.K.”),
found out that his 11-year-old child spent around $7,465 on in-app
purchases in just two weekends.13 The app Dobson’s son was using
utilized in-game currency, a form of currency that the player buys
with real-world money in order to pay for certain in-game items.14
In 2018, a survey by the U.K. Gambling Commission showed that
one underage gamer spent £1,000 a year, around $1,400, on FIFA
7

David Zendle et al., The Prevalence of Loot Boxes in Mobile and Desktop
Games,102 ADDICTION 1768, 1768 (2020).
8
Id.
9
Rob Thubron, Teenager Spends Almost $8,000 on Microtransactions Without
Father's Knowledge, TECHSPOT (Jan. 13, 2016, 9:30 AM),
https://www.techspot.com/news/63454-teenager-spends-almost-8000microtransactions-without-father-knowledge.html.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Matthew R. Yost, Video Game Gambling: Too Big a Bet for New Jersey, 70
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 335, 343 (2017).
13
Rob Thubron, 11-year-old Accidentally Spends Almost $7,500 on
Microtransactions Using, Dad's Credit Card, TECHSPOT (Apr. 4, 2017, 2:15
PM), https://www.techspot.com/news/68791-11-year-old-accidentally-spendsalmost-7500-microtransactions.html.
14
David Zendle et al., Paying for Loot Boxes is Linked to Problem Gambling,
Regardless of Specific Features Like Cash-Out and Pay-To-Win, 102
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 181, 183 (2020).
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loot boxes to obtain better players for his team. 15 In 2019, a
member of the public reported to the House of Commons’ Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport Committee that his adult son spent
£50,000 in the British game Runescape.16 The Commission was
shown a bank statement which showed that the son spent £247.93
in one day, by making five separate transactions.17 Jagex, the
company which runs Runescape, told the Commission that players
could possibly spend up to “£1,000 [per] week or £5,000 [per
month]”.18 Still, Jagex noted further, “only one player had hit that
limit in the previous 12 months.19
While these cases may be outliers, video game companies
rely on the income of these high-paying consumers—labeled
“whales.”20 The term originated in the gambling industry to refer
to “extremely wealthy, high roller patrons.”21 While 1.9% of all
players spent money on mobile games, these “whales” made up
90% of the $46.1 billion in total mobile game market revenue for
2017.22 These accounts from players, coupled with growing
revenues, began to concern international regulators who questioned
whether loot boxes should be considered gambling.
Newer releases of desktop games over the past several years
15

Alex Hern & Rob Davies, Video Game Loot Boxes Should be Classed as
Gambling, Says Commons, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2019, 1:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/sep/12/video-game-loot-boxesshould-be-classed-as-gambling-says-commons.
16
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 2017-2019, HC 1846, at ¶ 62 (U.K.).
17
Id.
18
Id. at ¶ 63.
19
Id.
20
Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 129, 140 (2019). Paul Tassi, Why It's Scary When 0.15% Mobile Gamers
Bring In 50% of the Revenue, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2014, 4:28 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2014/03/01/why-its-scary-when-0-15mobile-gamers-bring-in-50-of-the-revenue/.
21
Lisa Fletcher et al., Biggest Loser? Gambler Dropped $127M in a Year, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 8, 2009, 3:18 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/gamblerdropped-127-million-vegas-blames-casino-losses/story?id=9272730.
22
Andrei Klubnikin, Microtransactions in Games: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, GAMEANALYTICS (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://gameanalytics.com/blog/microtransactions-games-good-bad-ugly.html.
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have only increased the prevalence of loot boxes mechanics, as
“young people have reported that playing games with loot boxes
has led to addictive behavior….”23 Researchers note these
mechanics are designed with human psychology in mind to
encourage players to wager more and more of their money.24
Recent research shows a relationship between loot boxes and
gambling. 25 So, children who are exposed to video games with
loot boxes may develop gambling habits later in life.26 The
“emotional rush of loot boxes,” the growth of online celebrity
endorsements, and gameplay mechanics which use stringent
leveling systems and in-game currency, distort children’s
valuations of these in-game items, creating an environment that
coerces children to continue to purchase loot boxes.27
This paper seeks to answer the question of whether the United
States federal government has the authority to regulate loot boxes,
and whether loot boxes should be regulated through existing state
gambling laws or by federal statute.
Part I will examine the growing legal landscape regarding loot
box regulation in the United States and abroad. Part II will analyze
Congress’ authority to regulate loot boxes pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers28 and applicable limitations.29Part III
will examine common law theories on gambling and the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, to see how loot boxes may be
outside the reach of these laws. Finally, Part IV will look at policy
23

Matthew Busby, Loot Boxes Increasingly Common in Video Games Despite
Addiction Concerns, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 22, 2019, 5:51 A.M.),
https://www.theguardian.com/games/2019/nov/22/loot-boxes-increasinglycommon-in-video-games-despite-addictionconcerns#:~:text=Research%20by%20academics%20at%20the,over%20the%20
past%20nine%20years.
24
Zendle et al., supra note 14, at 182-83.
25
Zendle et al., supra note 14, at 183.
26
Id.
27
Elpidio Cruz, Note, Tbe Psychological and Virtual Siege of Loot Boxes, 23 J.
TECH. L. & POL'Y 215, 223-24 (2019). (The author uses the example of YouTube
vlogger, Ninja, to demonstrate the possible influence a single celebrity may have
over a significantly large audience, noting Ninja’s twenty-two million
subscribers and his level of notoriety garnering a monthly income of $500,000).
28
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012).
29
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018).
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considerations taken from a current congressional bill on the
subject of digital gambling and how the bill can help determine
steps for future regulation.
PART I: CURRENT RESPONSE TO LOOT BOXES AND
MICROTRANSACTIONS
A. Regulator Response: The Netherlands, Belgium, and the
United Kingdom
Over the past few years, regulators from all over the world
addressed or are addressing how loot boxes and other design
elements of video games borrow elements from the gambling
industry.30 For the purposes of this paper, we will first be exploring
Europe’s response to loot boxes. The Netherlands and Belgium are
examples of a strict legal approach to loot box regulation. These
nations implemented, what are effectively, total bans on loot
boxes, reasoning that they contravened their gambling laws.31 The
U.K. provides an interesting case study as regulators were
originally skeptical that loot boxes should be categorized as
gambling. During the legislative process, representatives of the
video game industry lobbied Parliament to show how loot boxes
were dissimilar to gambling.32 However, the U.K. government was
30

Kevin Webb, Regulators from More Than a Dozen Countries Are Looking to
Crack Down on 'Loot Boxes, ' A Controversial Video Gaming Practice that
Could Be Too Much Like Gambling, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2018, 6:49
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/loot-boxes-european-regulation-20189#:~:text=Regulators%20from%20more%20than%20a,be%20too%20much%20
like%20gambling&text=Belgium%20and%20the%20Netherlands%20have,and
%20have%20banned%20the%20practice.
31
David J. Castillo, Note, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest
Monetization System Flirts with Traditional Gambling Methods, 59 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 165, 187 (2019); see also Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling
for the Next Generation, 46 W. ST. L. REV. 61, 73-74 (2019)(After the
Netherlands Gaming Authority made their announcement developers Valve and
Electronic Arts removed loot box features from their games in the Netherlands.
After the Belgium Gambling Commission made their announcement of their
regulations, Valve, Blizzard, and Electronic Arts removed loot boxes features
from their games in Belgium.)
32
Ana Diaz, EA Calls Its Loot Boxes ‘Surprise Mechanics,’ Says They’re Used
Ethically, POLYGON, (Jun. 21, 2019, 9:10 AM),
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not persuaded by the video game industry and in a 2019 report,
which documented Parliament’s investigation into loot boxes,
ultimately concluded that loot boxes contained an element of
chance that made them unsuitable for sale to children, and should
therefore be prohibited.33 The report cited new research on
videogame design elements that showed a correlation between loot
boxes and gambling behavior.34
1. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, regulators have adopted substantial
regulations on loot boxes.35 In 2018, the Netherlands Gaming
Authority released a report that revealed “four out of ten loot boxes
violated the Betting and Gaming Act.”36 Those boxes violated the
Act because the “prizes were determined by chance” and “the
prizes could be traded outside of the game, thereby having market
value.”37 The Gaming Authority also conducted a study which
showed that all forms of loot boxes were addictive, despite finding
only certain loot boxes as gambling.38 The Gaming Authority
called on developers to remove “addiction-sensitive elements of
loot boxes” including the “stunning visual effects, ability to open
them in quick succession, and the ‘almost winning’ effects that
tease at a jackpot.”39 For games in the Netherlands, developers
such as Valve, immediately disabled the feature to open loot
boxes.40 Electronic Arts (“EA”) eliminated loot boxes from its
game Star Wars Battlefront II, in response to the Gaming

https://www.polygon.com/2019/6/21/18691760/ea-vp-loot-boxes-surprisemechanics-ethical-enjoyable.
33
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 79.
34
Id. at ¶ 80-85.
35
Edwin Hong, Loot Boxes: Gambling for the Next Generation, 46 W. ST. L.
REV. 61, 73 (2019).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 74.
39
Id. at 73.
40
Id.
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Authority’s findings.41 The Gaming Authority stated that it would
take action against other developers that violated these laws, which
would include fines or complete sales bans.42
2. Belgium
In Belgium, the Gambling Commission found that loot
boxes violated the Belgian Gaming and Betting Act.43 The
Commission looked at four elements to determine if loot boxes are
gambling.44 The elements were: “if it is 1) a game, where 2) a bet
is placed that leads to 3) loss or win by at least one player, and 4)
chance serves as an element in the course of the game, indication
of the winner, or determination of the size of winnings.”45 Opening
loot boxes or starting a spinning wheel, requires active
participation from the user, so these mechanics were considered a
game.46 The Commission found that purchasing a loot box or ingame currency constituted placing a bet.47 The loss or win element
was satisfied when loot boxes provided the player an item that
other players are precluded from obtaining.48 The use of a random
number generator satisfied the chance element of the test.49
The Belgium Commission made several recommendations
for future action including: “1) criminal prosecution for operators,
2) specific permits developed for games of chance in video games,
3) prohibitions on the purchase of games with paid loot boxes by
minors, and 4) age verifications in markets.”50 After the
Commission made these recommendations, members of the
gaming industry quickly responded. Valve immediately disabled
opening of loot crates in Belgium.51 Blizzard, another video game
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id. at 75.
44
Id. at 74.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 75.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
42
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developer, stated that it would disable its loot boxes in its virtual
card game Heroes of the Storm.52 EA refused to remove loot boxes
from its FIFA series games, which resulted in a criminal
investigation by the Brussels prosecutor’s office.
3. The United Kingdom
In a 2017 inquiry, the U.K.’s Gambling Commission took
the stance that loot boxes were not gambling because their in-game
items were not capable of being cashed out in the real world.53
However, the Gambling Commission has begun to shift its
position.
In 2018, the Gambling Commission found that thirty-one
percent of young people, ages 11-16, claimed to “have paid money
or used in-game items to open loot boxes to get other in-game
items, within a computer or app-based game.”54 The Commission
saw an increase in the number of respondents who were considered
“at-risk” gamblers under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders Fourth Edition’s (“DSM-IV”) problem gambling
screen.55 The individuals “at-risk” for problem gambling rose from
0.9% in 2017 to 1.7% in 2018.56 The Commission also saw an
increase in the number of respondents who were considered
“problem” gamblers under the DSM-IV’s criteria for problem
gambling.57
A recent study in the U.K. by Dr. David Zendle has shown
a correlation between loot boxes and problem gambling across a
variety of age groups.58 There were two correlations that were
found among the results: first, that “the more money gamers spent
52

Id.
Loot boxes within video games, GAMBLING COMMISSION, (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/news-action-and-statistics/News/lootboxes-within-video-games.
54
GAMBLING COMMISSION, YOUNG PEOPLE & GAMBLING 2018, 2018, HC, at 6
(U.K.) https://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/survey-data/young-peopleand-gambling-2018-report.pdf.
55
Id. (The acronym for the screen is the DSM-IV-MR-J).
56
Id. at 32.
57
Id.
58
Zendle et. al., supra note 14, at 190.
53
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on loot boxes, the more severe their problem gambling”59 and
second, that “gamers who paid for loot boxes scored more than
twice as high on measures of problem gambling than those who
did not.”60
Other factors that strengthened the relationship between loot
box spending and problem gambling included “near misses” and
the use of “in-game currency,” also known as “scrips” in the
gambling industry.61
Near-misses are a feature in different kinds of real-world
gambling where the player is shown that they were close to
winning a highly-valued prize but instead won a prize of lesser or
no value.62 Research on gambling shows that near-misses “lead to
cognitive distortions whereby the player believes they are more
likely to win in the future” and the player is encouraged to
continue playing.63 Real-world examples include slot machines,
which show losing combinations that are close to those required to
win large amounts.64 Near-miss mechanics are found in the video
game Dota 2, where players are shown a spinning selection of
rewards that disappear over time.65 Often, the player will receive a
less valuable reward, however, some of the last rewards to
disappear are extremely rare.66
Scrips are a substitute for currency used in the gambling
context to create valuation biases so players don’t have a reference
for how much they are spending.67 This feature is commonly
represented through casino chips.68 Past research shows that real59

Id.
Id.
61
Id. at 187-88. (Scrips are a substitute for real-world currency, and in the
context of video games, act as a middleman between real world currency and ingame currency. Near misses, in the context of loot boxes, are mechanic where
players are shown a variety of rare items that players might have won by
opening that loot box. Typically, this display implies that players have almost
received these valuable items from opening the loot box.)
62
Id. at 183.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
60
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world poker players’ tendencies to gamble are strengthened when
they are using chips compared to when they are using cash.69 In
Fire Emblem Heroes, players can use real-world currency to
purchase a certain number of orbs for “the chance to randomly
receive a new character.”70 Dr. Zendle’s study showed that similar
to a poker players’ tendency to spend more with chips, a gamer’s
tendency to spend more on loot boxes was strengthened when
using in-game currency albeit a much smaller magnitude.71
Ultimately, the U.K. is moving toward national regulation of
loot boxes. The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
(“Department”) conducted numerous oral investigations with
members of relevant agencies, video game industry leaders, and
researchers, studying loot boxes and their effects on players.72 A
Department report outlined the potential “psychosocial and
financial harms” to gamers through the use of “immersive
technologies.”73
The Department defined “immersive
technologies” as technologies that “ integrate virtual content with
the physical environment thus ‘immersing’ the user in a simulated
experience.”74 The Department identified that the mechanics
behind these immersive technologies can cause serious harm to a
minority of people who struggle to maintain control over their use
of digital technology.75 In identifying the potential harms of these
immersive the report looked into the links between game design
mechanics and gambling, where loot boxes were one of the main
mechanics investigated.76
B. Loot Boxes – Mechanics and Lack of Uniformity in Rating
An issue the Department explored was why games with
loot boxes were not rated as games that contained simulated
69

Id.
Id.
71
Id. at 188.
72
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16.
73
Id. at 3.
74
Id. at 6.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Id.
70
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gambling.77 They noted the Gambling Commission’s 2018 report,
which reported that thirty-one percent of 11-16-year-old gamers
had paid money for a loot box or used in-game items to open loot
boxes.78 The Department also noted that a study from Dr. Zendle
and Dr. Paul Cairns found a link between “the amount that gamers
spend on loot boxes and their score on the Problem Gambling
Severity Index (PGSI).”79 The Zendle and Cairns study consisted
of 7,000 gamers and suggested “'the gambling-like features of loot
boxes are specifically responsible for the observed relationship
between problem gambling and spending on loot boxes,’ as other
forms of microtransactions80 did not display such a strong link.”81
Furthermore, the study found the same link was twice as strong
among adolescents as it was in adults.82 When asked to speak on
the matter, Dr. Zendle stated that while a causative relationship
between loot boxes and problem gambling has not been
established, individuals who are predisposed to gambling addiction
can develop issues as they migrate from video game gambling
mechanics in loot boxes to real-world casinos.83
The Department looked at older research to determine the
basic gambling mechanics used to make video game gambling so
addictive.84 Research from the early 20th century showed that the
randomness throughout the mechanism created the gambling
addiction.85 Random rewards are used as a reinforcement
mechanism to keep a player engaged.86 A prime example of the
randomness principle is a slot machine, where the player performs
77

Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 27; see also Hong, supra note 35, at 74.
79
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16.
80
Id. at 24. (“[M]icrotransactions” - small payments that players make
throughout the process of playing a game, for example to acquire in-game skills
or items or to progress more quickly through levels).
81
Id. at 29.
82
Id. at 29; see also Hong, supra note 35, at 75.
83
DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, IMMERSIVE AND
ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 16 at 30.
84
Id. at 42.
85
Id.
86
Id.
78
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an action (pulls a lever), there is a delay (quick or long), then there
is a reward (big or small). Video game developers use this
principle to extend user involvement or get them to come back to
the game.87 King, the developer of the game Candy Crush, uses
this mechanism by providing the player with pop-ups at random
intervals offering motivation or a “free spin” to win a power-up
that enhances gameplay.88 Here, the player “pulls a lever” by
playing the game, the delay in the pop-up is random, and the
reward is random as well.89 Through this system, the player is
rewarded for just using the app, incentivizing future use.90
Industry leaders were reluctant to discuss data on player
engagement or acknowledge the active use of these psychological
mechanics in their games.91 For example, Dr. Jo Twist, CEO of
The Association for U.K. Interactive Entertainment (“UKIE”)
argues that players have agency in the choice of games they play
and how long they play them.92 Richard Wilson, the Chief
Executive of The Independent Game Developers' Association
(“TIGA”), a trade organization for the video game industry in
Europe, acknowledged that there were players who played video
games excessively.93 However, he also stated that government
solutions required participation from representatives of the
industry and should take conservative steps going forward.94 The
Department found the lack of acknowledgement over the particular
mechanics of the video games as well as the lack of transparency
from developers “unacceptable.”95
The Gambling Commission reported to the Department that it
was concerned that the current Pan European Game Information
(“PEGI”) ratings were not being enforced uniformly in regards to
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gambling mechanics in video games.96 One parent was concerned
that a game called Bricky Farm was rated for 4 year olds when it
contained a roulette style wheel which gave the player gems for
further advancement in the game.97 The Gambling Commission
agreed that “current age ratings were not in line with public
expectation” as games containing gambling mechanics should not
be allowed to children in the “4-plus” and “12-plus” PEGI
ratings.98 The Department recommended the immediate
establishment of a scientific working group to look at the effects of
gambling-like mechanics in video games.99
Dr. Zendle also raised concerns that current PEGI guidelines
place warnings on games with simulated gambling, but not on
games containing loot boxes.100 Dr. Zendle made
recommendations to the Department to: (1) have PEGI create
content descriptors and parental warnings for games with loot
boxes, and (2) consider restricting games with loot boxes to people
of legal gambling age.101 The head of the Gambling Commission
agreed with Dr. Zendle and recommended that the U.K.
government apply the same PEGI ratings for gambling games and
age restrictions to games containing loot boxes.102
C. Loot Boxes – Fitting them into the Legal Framework.
Another issue that the Department explored was how to fit
loot boxes as gambling under the present legal framework in the
U.K..103 The largest issues were: (1) valuation,104 and (2)
determining if loot boxes are games of chance.105 The Department
posed this question to Dr. Aaron Drummond and Dr. James Sauer,
96
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researchers looking into the psychological similarities between loot
boxes and real-world gambling.106 They stated that the current
definition of “value” was too narrow and did not represent the
social value in the prizes won through loot boxes and the
psychological power this value had to influence human
behavior.107 Another form of valuation came from the presence of
skin-betting websites.108 The Gambling Commission concluded
that video game companies effectively act as a central bank to
disseminate in-game items and that skin-betting provides
continuous engagement with the game as players try to collect
more skins.109 The Department agreed that the definition of value
needed to be expanded to reflect the reality of people’s experiences
in spending real-world money in video games.110
Furthermore, the Department decided that the business
models of game developers created imbalances of information
regarding the methods these games use to maximize users’
attention,111 which can incentivize players to interact with
gambling mechanics in their games.112 An example of game
development that encourages players to purchase loot boxes is
“gaming telemetry,” which collects a player’s data in the
background for use in analytics.” to help with flow.113 Some
companies, such as EA, use this data for dynamic difficulty
adjustment, where the difficulty of the video game may be
automatically adjusted to keep the user engaged.114 In pay-to-win
games with online multiplayer gameplay, difficulty adjustment will
come in the form of pairing a lesser-skilled player with a more
skilled player to incentivize the lesser-skilled player to engage in a
106
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microtransaction to gain a competitive advantage.115 In EA’s Star
Wars Battlefront II, players could find “Star Cards” in loot boxes,
which gave stat boosts and abilities to users’ characters.116 These
loot boxes could be earned through gameplay or purchased.117
However, many players found the gameplay method so difficult
that the immediacy of receiving a loot box through a
microtransaction seemed necessary to maintain “competitive
balance” in online multiplayer battles.118
Video game companies were not clear with the Department
as to how they used player information gained through
telemetry.119 Epic Games, the company that owns Fortnite, refused
to give the Department details on player engagement, despite
giving players weekly reports on their playtimes.120 EA’s
spokesperson gave a similar answer regarding gameplay
information in FIFA, and refused to provide data on length of play,
despite the fact that EA tracks this data.121 The Department
declared that the companies were “willfully obtuse” about how
they used this data.122
The Department not only looked at what video game
companies put in their games to facilitate loot box spending, but
also what they did not put to deter minors from loot box
mechanics.123 Notably, the Department focused on the lack of “age
estimation” algorithms.124 These algorithms collect data to
compare against the age a user states in their player profile as a
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form of age verification.125 The Department viewed these lack of
robust controls over underage gambling as companies not fully
considering the adverse effects loot boxes had on users.126
The aforementioned nations referenced in Part I are some of
the first to approach the regulation of loot boxes through the lens
of national gambling laws. The Netherlands and Belgium approach
provides an analogue that can be applied to a federal regulatory
scheme in the United States (“U.S.”).127 Currently, U.S. gambling
is governed by both federal and state law.128 The way in which
European countries define gambling and how they go about
regulating loot boxes under these definitions helps to highlight the
problems with regulating loot boxes under U.S. state gambling
laws, which will be discussed below. Ultimately, this paper will
argue for a ban similar to the Netherlands and Belgium, but with a
more constrained focus on restricting sales of loot boxes to
children. However, at this moment, the U.S. is similar to the U.K.
in that its appropriate regulatory agency, the Federal Trade
Commission, is still investigating various sources and examining
different solutions. The following section will look at the latest
step that the U.S. federal government has taken to address the
growing concern of loot boxes.
D. The United States – Recent FTC Workshop
In 2018, Senator Maggie Hassan requested that the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) investigate loot boxes in video
games.129 On November 27, 2018, the FTC Chairman agreed to
Senator Hassan’s request.130 On February 22, 2019, the FTC stated
it was holding a public workshop to gather perspectives from both
the “gaming industry and consumer advocates.”131
125
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On August 7, 2019, the FTC held a public workshop called
“Inside the Game: Unlocking the Consumer Issues Surrounding
Loot Boxes.”132 The event was divided up into three panels133. The
first panel “explore[d] the role of loot boxes and other similar
mechanics and the impact of monetization modes on end users.”134
The second panel presented recent academic research on the role of
loot boxes.135 The third panel discussed “self-regulatory initiatives
and consumer education.”136 However, the subject matter and the
solutions the panelists spoke on fell into a spectrum of federal
intervention with industry self-regulation of loot boxes on one end
and then full regulation on every aspect of microtransactions on the
other.137
E. Industry Self-Regulation
Sean Kane, a founding member of the Video Game Bar
Association, suggested that the decision to make in-game
purchases and what content should be available to children, should
be left to the end user, assuming the user is an adult.138 Kane gave
a history of video games that detailed how as development costs
went up, the companies needed ways of gaining revenue aside
from just the retail price.139 Kane highlighted the “freemium”
model as providing player diversity in the games available to them,
since these games are free to download and play.140 While there
may be items to purchase in these games, ultimately, player agency
Year, THE VERGE (Feb. 22, 2019, 12:31 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/22/18236352/loot-box-video-game-ftcworkshop-hassan-congress.
132
FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES (2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1511966/loot_boxes
_workshop_transcript.pdf.
133
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governs whether they make the microtransaction.141 When Kane
spoke of loot boxes, he stated that not all loot boxes have a random
element as some loot boxes tell the player its contents.142
Similarly, Jeff Haynes, the Senior Editor at Common Sense
Media, argued that parents and consumers should have the choice
whether to buy games containing loot box and
microtransactions.143 Haynes explored how certain kinds of loot
boxes incentivize players to buy them because they provide
upgrades that allow players to earn higher rewards.144 Haynes also
noted the developer controls the odds and the payout of the
items.145 Despite this, Haynes argued that ultimately the player has
the autonomy to only purchase premium games that do not have
loot boxes.146
Mike Warneke, Chief Counsel of Tech Policy at the
Entertainment Software Association, the leading trade organization
for video game developers, defended the elements in video games
suspected of incentivizing gambling behaviors.147He described loot
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 132.
Id. at 23.
143
Id. at 38.
144
Id. at 30. The first category of loot box is the “cosmetic loot box.” These loot
boxes feature items that customize the design of characters, their weapons, or ingame expressions. The second category of loot box is the “mode specific” loot
box. These types of loot boxes are tied to specific sections of the game and can
be used to get better characters for multiplayer settings and provide a
competitive advantage. Haynes states that these types of loot boxes are still
largely optional because the player can earn the items during normal gameplay.
However, he does note that some companies will make earning the items more
difficult, so as to make it near impossible to earn certain power-ups without
resorting to loot-boxes. Haynes gives the example of Star Wars Battlefront II,
where the amount of time to get one power-up would take real-world days of
consistent gameplay. The third category of loot box is the “pay-to-loot” model
where the players are required to pay money to ultimately be successful. This
mechanic is found in online card games like Hearthstone and Magic the
Gathering, where only certain packs will reward high level cards. Shooters, such
as Call of Duty: Black Ops, will make you pay for high-powered gear but the
game then places the gear in “blackjack staches,” and so the player can only
acquire that gear at random.
145
Id. at 33.
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Id. at 38.
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Id. at 46-48.
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boxes as a mechanism not consistent with gambling and in-game
currency as not a form of scrip.148 Warneke compared loot boxes to
baseball cards, arguing that both loot boxes and baseball cards
contain an item the purchaser can generally predict, but the buyer
does not know the specific item until they open it.149
Warneke’s generalization of in-game currency downplayed
their use as scrips, and instead analogized the mechanism more to
play money.150 He said publishers use this currency, instead of
having the player pay cash directly, because (1) it is impractical to
make the player have to go through the entire transaction process
for every $1 transaction, and (2) to preserve narrative integrity in
the game.151 Under Warneke’s theory, play money helps to
facilitate transactions, while also maintaining the design of the
game by disguising the money as a currency that fits within the
setting.152
Patricia Vance, president of the Entertainment Software
Rating Board (“ESRB”), spoke on current parental controls
implemented for game labeling and system settings.153 Current
labeling for physical copies, as of 2018, presents descriptors that
indicate the ability for “in-game spending.”154 This label is
required on any game that holds opportunities for the player to
have the ability to “make a purchase using cash.”155 Parental
settings within the platforms allow parents to control what parts of
the video games children can access.156 Parents have the ability to
“control in-game purchases or block them altogether.”157 Account
holders can also be notified whenever a purchase is made.158
Vance argued against further government regulation, by
asserting that disclosing in-game purchasing options and providing
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 132.
Id.
150
Id. at 47.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 168-79.
154
Id. at 176.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 173.
157
Id.
158
Id.
148
149

108

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:1

parents with controls to these features were sufficient to stop
children from purchasing loot boxes.159 The ESRB performed
research and saw that parents were becoming more informed over
time about loot boxes, and determined that active communication,
not government regulation, was the key to informing parents so
that they could make decisions.160 Vance assured the panel that
parents could find information on how to implement controls on
systems and navigate video games on the ESRB website.161 Vance
also gave assurances that the ESRB would partner with retailers
like GameStop to provide an insert with every physical purchase of
a new console, that will remind parents to set parental controls on
their accounts.162 However, it should be noted that free-to-play
games aren’t sold at brick-and-mortar stores, so this plan may not
be as effective as Vance assures.
Development costs are an important business concern as
well, as costs have risen into the hundreds of millions for some
games.163 Most costs come from growing marketing expenses. For
example, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2, cost up to $50 million
to produce but the “marketing expenses and the cost of producing
and distributing discs” created a launch budget of $200 million.164
However, the workshop focused on the need for balancing these
concerns with the growing concern for the impact loot boxes have
on children’s mental health.165
F. Government Regulation
The researchers participating in the FTC workshop
FED. TRADE COMM’N ,supra note 132 at 228-29.
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commented on current studies regarding the effect of loot boxes on
gamers,166 while consumer advocacy groups spoke on the need for
federal regulation.167
The researchers at the panel presented data that suggested a
link between loot box spending and negative effects on human
behavior.168 Dr. Zendle, in particular, commented that the features
of loot boxes “look[ed] so much like gambling.”169 Dr. Zendle also
argued that problem gambling could be triggered by loot boxes as
the gamer originally does not start spending much money, but then,
over time, spends more and more money on loot boxes as their
gambling problem becomes more severe.170 As the gamer becomes
more conditioned to the formal gambling characteristics of loot
boxes, this conditioning transfers over when the gamer encounters
real-world gambling that shares these characteristics with loot
boxes.171 Dr. Zendle also found that there was a link to problem
gambling regardless of the type of loot box a game utilized.172
However, he noted that further research was required to explore
the correlation.173 Still, Dr. Zendle suggested that analogies to
baseball cards were not appropriate because determining the safety
of a device based on similarities to other objects would not
adequately determine the safety of the technology at issue.174
166
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Dr. Adam Elmachtoub stated that regulation should be
aimed at monitoring a company’s listed probabilities for certain
items.175 He first approaches this topic by defining loot boxes by
their effect on consumer valuations.176 He divided loot boxes into
two categories: unique boxes and traditional boxes.177 Unique
boxes give an item randomly but will always allocate a new,
unique item to the player.178 Traditional boxes will give an item
randomly but the player can potentially receive duplicates.179
Through economic analysis, he found that unique boxes benefitted
the developer because they could charge a premium for rarer
prizes.180 Traditional boxes benefitted the consumer because the
possibility of duplicate items necessitates a lower price point.181
Dr. Elamchtoub argues that the traditional loot box system should
be preferred since a player can buy the same number of loot boxes
as unique loot boxes, but pay less money in the long-run.182 The
seller retains some value because the rare item is still available to
sell in another box.183 In order to keep the traditional loot box
relatively fair, sellers should set the probabilities uniformly at
random.184 However, companies can make more money by lying
about these probabilities.185 Dr. Elamchtoub recommends that
regulation would be needed to monitor developers to ensure
probabilities are not changed and to protect consumers from
potentially paying more money than they usually would.186
Representatives from NGOs specializing in consumer
protection spoke out as proponents for regulation of loot boxes.187
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John Breyault, Vice President of the National Consumers League,
argued that the informational asymmetry greatly affects younger
players who are not as capable of apprising the “value proposition
of these [industry] schemes.”188 Breyault explained that research
from Dr. Zendle found that adolescents were twice as likely to
show measurements of problem gambling than adults under similar
circumstances.189 Players can also be confused by the exchange
rates of money as more video games incorporate in-game
currencies.190 Price tags on items can read “$1.99” which can
mislead a player from the practical price of “$2,” and so the player
will more likely spend money on the item.191 Bonuses piled on top
of their purchases can make young players lose sight of the item’s
value.192 Breyault also found fault with the baseball card analogy,
as baseball cards have fixed odds because they are physically
produced for sets.193 Loot boxes are different because their odds
can be manipulated based on greater amounts of information given
by the player.194
Anna Laitin, director of financial policy for Consumer
Reports, spoke on how the ESRB label for in-game purchases
addressed quite a huge range of microtransactions, lacking detail in
what type of purchases are included with the game.195 The label
can range from buying a new character, all the way to surprise loot
boxes.196 Despite mobile games containing more detailed
information sections, the labels shown at the front contain the
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broad label of “in-app purchases.”197
Laitin also spoke on “dark patterns,” which she defined as
“[t]actics to nudge consumer[s] [toward] taking actions.”198
“Grinding” is a game design feature that has been adapted to make
players do pointless work over a long period of time to make loot
boxes seem like a less costly alternative.199 Daily bonuses
incentivize people to keep playing every day.200 Pay-to-win
features allow a gamer to play the game, but performance is
hindered in competitive play if they do not spend money on items
to help with gameplay.201
Keith Whyte, executive director of the National Council on
Problem Gambling, went further and advocated for the
establishment of a regulatory framework around loot boxes.202 The
National Council on Problem Gambling is neutral in its stance on
legalized gambling, with decades of experience and partnerships
with the “government, gaming industry, counselors, regulators,
researchers, and recovering gamblers.”203 Whyte noted that most
published studies on the connection between loot boxes and
gambling have “found an association” between the two.204 Whyte
further stated, “protection features must be put in place to protect
vulnerable players from developing gambling problems.”205
Known populations susceptible to gambling problems include
“males, youth, and…veterans.”206 Therefore, he argued that
regulatory framework for loot boxes should be modeled off
frameworks regulating the gambling industry.207
One recommendation Whyte gave as a remedy was to
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improve information transparency.208 The video game industry
should create ways to incentivize a player’s “pro-social behavior,”
such as figuring out the odds in a game.209 Incentivization is an
opportunity for the video game industry to improve further than the
gambling industry by displaying the odds in a more understandable
way than complex play tables for slot machines.210
Another recommendation was to raise the ESRB rating for
games with loot boxes to users of a higher age than those in the
“Teen” rating.211 Whyte noted that in the gambling industry, there
are discussions about consumer education protection, so it follows
that with loot boxes, ratings should properly reflect the content in
video games.212 Whyte notes that if a parent based their parental
controls on the ESRB rating, and this rating is artificially low, then
“that might not trigger the appropriate level of parental
controls.”213
Keith Whyte further argued that third-party objective
regulation is necessary as a consumer protection feature to ensure
that video game developers are held accountable to the odds stated
to their players.214 Whyte noted that members of the gambling
industry would not trust slot machine manufacturers to self-certify
“the odds and randomness of their machines.”215
Another suggestion to limit harm to players is to allow
gamblers to self-exclude by limiting payments from the gamer.216
This system can be effective since the gambling occurs in an
environment where transactions are monitored.217 Third-party
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132 at 189-90.
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regulators would need information from developers to determine if
these systems are in place.218 Whyte also suggests companies
should publicly disclose their information on player participation
and loot box spending.219
Much of these panelists’ concerns of the effects loot boxes
have on children are rooted in how much video game companies
rely on loot boxes to make massive profits.220 Developer EA
received thirty-one percent of its net bookings over the past three
years just from microtransactions.221 The EA game Star Wars
Battlefront II, made approximately $2.8 billion from
microtransactions alone in 2019.222 In EA’s last quarter for 2019,
the company made $993 million in microtransactions.223 Take-Two
Interactive, parent company to Rockstar and 2K Games, made
$857.8 million in “recurrent consumer spending” for the threemonth period ending in September 30, 2019.224 Recurrent
consumer spending is defined by “all manner of ‘ongoing
consumer engagement’” including “virtual currency, add-on
content, and in-game purchases.”225 Such spending was thirtyseven percent of Take-Two Interactive’s total revenue during the
three-month period ending in September 30, 2019.226 This trend
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220
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does not look like it is stopping either; as John Breyault noted in
the panel, “[T]otal spending on loot boxes and skin gambling is
forecast to go up to $50 billion by 2022, and that's nearly doubling
since last year.”227 While this paper does not examine whether
companies purposefully target loot boxes towards children, their
reliance on loot boxes to make a profit despite children engaging
with these mechanics, draws concern as to whether video game
companies are trying hard enough to protect child consumers.
Ultimately, these panelists overwhelmingly pointed out the
need for regulation in regard to the sales of loot boxes to
children.228 Highlighted in an FTC report on the presentation,
“several of the panelists and comments to the public docket . . .
[noted] . . . that kids are vulnerable to manipulation and social
pressure, or may not fully understand the costs of the
transaction.”229 Even with assurances from the industry of
protections such as the “ESRB’s current rating system, disclosures,
and parental controls, some panelists and commenters questioned
whether the current protections were sufficient.”230 As Dr. Domoff
noted, parental interaction with children is very limited when it
comes to how they monitor children’s social media use.231 This
lack of supervision likely extends to loot box purchases, so without
adequate parental interaction, the risk of harm spreads to a larger
number of children. While the report noted that the panelists came
to a diverse set of conclusions, the FTC noted some panelists
asserted that “the industry has not policed this area well and
government regulation will mitigate the risk that industry
economic motivations could result in consumer exploitation.”232
This position falls in line with the growing concern within Europe,
which has shifted to directly regulating loot boxes at a national
level.233 This growing concern for the potential harms to children’s
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 58.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC VIDEO GAME LOOT BOX WORKSHOP: STAFF
PERSPECTIVE 3 (2020).
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 149-50.
232
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, note 132, at 6.
233
Haydn Taylor, Loot Boxes Should be a Consumer Protection Matter Not a
Gambling One, Says EU Report, GAMESINDUSTRY.BIZ, Jul. 27, 2020,
227
228
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psychology, ease for children to purchase these products, and the
wide, interstate reach of the online market necessitates setting the
United States’ gaze on federally regulating loot boxes. The
question is now, how should the United States accomplish this?
PART II: ANTI-COMMANDEERING AND THE COMMERCE POWER
As regulatory efforts pick up steam in the United States, this
paper examines the extent of the federal government’s regulatory
authority over gambling and microtransactions as an economic
activity. In the context of loot boxes and similar mechanics as a
form of gambling, the following section will examine Murphy v.
NCAA, the latest Supreme Court case on the subject of
gambling.234 Since Murphy’s holding gave states more authority to
govern sports gambling, it is necessary to understand the possible
limits that the anti-commandeering doctrine may place on the
federal government regarding the regulation of loot boxes as a
form of gambling.235
The subsequent sections will examine Congress’ power over
interstate commerce to demonstrate the power the federal
government will likely use to regulate microtransactions and loot
boxes.
A. Murphy v. NCAA – Anti-Commandeering and the States
One step in understanding limits to the federal government’s
ability to regulate loot boxes and their application to the states is to
examine Murphy, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
federal government can only regulate individuals, not the states.236
The facts in Murphy were as follows. In 1992, Congress passed the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”),
which made it unlawful for a state “to sponsor, operate, advertise,
https://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2020-07-27-loot-boxes-should-be-aconsumer-protection-matter-not-gambling-says-eu-report; see also, Diaz, supra,
note 32; Hong, supra, note 35, at 75.
234
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018).
235
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482.
236
Id. at 1476.
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promote, license, or authorize by law or compact…. a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting gambling, or wagering scheme
based… on competitive sporting events.”237 PASPA allowed the
United States Attorney General and sports organizations to file suit
in federal court against states that violated the Act.238 In Murphy,
the New Jersey Legislature enacted a statute that authorized sports
gambling within the state,239 repealing state provisions that
prohibited sports gambling schemes.240 The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (“NCAA”) brought an action against the New
Jersey Governor and other state officials, seeking to enjoin the law
as the NCAA argued that the law violated PASPA.241 New Jersey
responded by arguing that PASPA unconstitutionally infringed on
the State’s sovereign authority and implicated the anticommandeering doctrine.242
The Supreme Court held that the PASPA provision, which
prohibited state authorization of sports gambling, violated the anticommandeering doctrine.243 Justice Alito wrote that the anticommandeering doctrine “withholds from Congress the power to
issue orders directly to the States.”244 The Court looked to New
York v. United States, where the federal government passed a law
that required states to “take title” to low-level radioactive waste or
to “regulate according to the instructions of Congress.”245 The
Court in that case held the scheme unconstitutional. Justice
O’Connor noted that the Constitution “confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States.”246 Further, the New York
237

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470; See 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470-71.
239
Id. at 1471.
240
Id. at 1465.
241
Id. at 1471.
242
Id. at 1470-71. (“The anticommandeering doctrine may sound arcane, but it is
simply the expression of a fundamental structural decision incorporated into the
Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue
orders directly to the States.”).
243
Id. at 1478.
244
Id. at 1475.
245
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
112, 144 (1992).
246
Murphy, 138 S. Ct.at 1476. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 144.
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Court noted that Congress has the power to “pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts,” but lacks the power to compel the States
to require or prohibit those acts.247 The law violated the anticommandeering doctrine because it directed the States to become
agents of Congress and the federal government by forcing the
States to “take title.”248
In Murphy, the Court held that when a state “completely or
partially repeals” old laws that ban sports gambling, then the state
is “authorizing that activity.”249 The New Jersey statute repealing
the state ban on sports gambling “permitt[ed]” and “authoriz[ed]”
sports betting.250 This authorization violated the provision in
PASPA, but the Court found that the PASPA provision violated
the anti-commandeering doctrine.251
However, the anti-commandeering doctrine does allow for the
federal government to govern private actors directly, just not state
legislatures.252 The Court in Murphy elaborated on several cases
that illustrated federal schemes that governed private actors but did
not impose on state sovereignty.253
247

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476-77. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477. See also New York, 505 U.S. at 178.(“Where a
federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so
directly; it may not conscript state governments as its agents.”).
249
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
250
Id.
251
Id. at 1478.
252
Id. at 1476-77.
253
Id. at 1476-78. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) ( In South
Carolina v. Baker, the Court held that a federal statute requiring states to issue
registered bonds, punishable by denying federal tax exemptions to state and
local bonds, did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. The statute only
required the state to conform to a federal standard that applied to the federal
government and private corporations. The statute did not make the state enact
the law for the federal government, but rather used the exemptions as an
incentive.); see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 146 (2000) (In Reno v. Condon,
the Court held that a federal statute preventing state motor vehicle departments
(DMVs) from disclosing personal information on record did not violate the anticommandeering doctrine. The statute applied to both state and private persons
that obtained information from a DMV. Similar to Baker, the federal statute
“regulated state activities” rather than sought “to control or influence the manner
in which States regulate private parties.”); see Hodel v. VA Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (In Hodel v. VA Surface Mining &
248
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B. Murphy Establishes that Federal Regulation of Video Game
Gambling May Not Violate the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
In accordance with Murphy, the federal government would not
have trouble enforcing a regulatory regime over gambling
mechanics in video game content, even if a state already made
gambling regulations against these mechanics in video games as
Congress can regulate the video developers directly.254
Speaking more to the necessity for federal regulation, no state
has successfully passed state legislation to regulate loot boxes or
gambling mechanics. 255 States have tried and failed to pass any
laws on loot boxes in the context of state gambling, the federal
government has more of a reason to regulate freely without
conflicting with anti-commandeering principles. In Murphy, New
Jersey already had a state law that prohibited sports gambling, so
when the New Jersey legislature repealed the restriction on sports
gambling, PASPA’s ban compelled state action to align itself with

Reclamation Association, the Court held that the federal statute establishing a
regulatory regime over surface coal mining operations, premised on
“cooperative federalism”, did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. The
federal statute required that the States adopt a permanent program to regulate
surface level coal mining, and if a state failed to submit a program, the federal
government would implement a federal program in the state. This regulatory
scheme did not violate the anti-commandeering doctrine because the federal
government “allowed”, but did not “require” the States to participate in the
program.)
254
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
255
Hong, supra note 35, at 77-79. (In Hawaii, Congressman Chris Lee tried to
get two bills passed through the Hawaii House of Representatives. The House
Bill failed and the Senate Bill is unrecognizable to the House Bill. In
Washington, Senator Kevin Ranker introduced Senate Bill 6266, which would
instruct the Washington Gambling Commission to “investigate the use of loot
boxes and similar mechanisms.” The bill, indefinitely postponed since February
of 2018, currently sits in the Washington Senate Committee on Rules. In
Minnesota, Representative Rick Hansen introduced House Bill 4460, which
would prohibit sales of video games containing loot boxes to a person under the
age of 18. As of writing this paper this bill is still in the House Committee on
Commerce and Regulatory Reform.
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the federal law.256 Since no state statutes currently exist on loot
boxes, the federal government can take regulatory action toward
loot boxes and other gambling mechanics in video games under the
Commerce Clause, mentioned later on, without potentially
violating the anti-commandeering doctrine.257
Marc Edelman, a professor of law at the Zicklin School of
Business, wrote that the Supreme Court allowed the states an
“opportunity to introduce their own sports-gambling laws based on
their own independent policy.”258 After Murphy, Delaware, New
Jersey, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Rhode
Island passed laws legalizing casino-style gambling.259 While
Congress cannot compel the States to take State action to
accomplish federal goals on gambling, if the federal government
does not choose to regulate, then the States are free to regulate
gambling for their own citizens.260
It is still unclear what outcomes could occur if a state
decides to pass its own laws to regulate loot box activity. As
explained in Murphy, the federal government cannot restrict State
legislatures from exercising their sovereign authority to regulate
gambling within their borders.261 However, one way the federal
government could still regulate loot boxes and other gambling
mechanics within video games is by directly targeting video game
developers and the Entertainment Software Association (“ESA”).
As we will discuss soon, private actors engaged in an economic
activity can be regulated through Congressional legislation under
the Commerce Clause.262
C. The Commerce Power: National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius

256

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1465.
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012).
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Marc Edelman, Developments: Regulating Sports Gambling in the Aftermath
of Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
313, 339 (2018).
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Id. at 325.
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Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
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Id.
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Congress can regulate existing, interstate economic activity
through the Commerce Clause.263 Microtransactions are the mode
by which players purchase virtual items such as loot boxes and
other downloadable content.264 With the rise of online gaming,
gamers can make microtransactions on their device anywhere in
the United States.265 Microtransaction regulation would fall under
the Commerce Clause as an economic activity266 or an activity
when aggregated with other activities, affects commerce.267
In 2018, the video game industry made total revenue
exceeding $43 billion.268 The nature of this economic activity is
predominantly interstate, with digital format sales consisting of
eighty-three percent of the content revenue made throughout the
industry.269 Additionally, the video game industry self-regulates
when it comes to microtransactions and the nature of their
products.270 For example, the ESA is the leading representative of
the video game industry, representing the industry in matters such
as free speech271 and government attempts to link video games
with gun violence.272 The interstate nature of digital sales and the
263

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
264
Brian Crecente, What are DLC, Loot Boxes and Microtransactions? An
Explainer, VARIETY (Nov. 28, 2017, 8:28 AM),
https://variety.com/2017/gaming/features/what-is-a-loot-box-1203047991/.
265
The Unstoppable Rise of Online Gaming, ON: YORKSHIRRE MAGAZINE,
https://www.on-magazine.co.uk/stuff/tech/the-unstoppable-rise-of-onlinegaming/.
266
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012).
267
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
268
ESA, ENTM’T. SOFTWARE ASS’N, 2019 Essential Facts About the Computer
and Video Game Industry (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
https://www.theesa.com/esa-research/2019-essential-facts-about-the-computerand-video-game-industry/.
269
Id.
270
PROMARKET, Self-Regulation and the Video Game Industry: A New Stigler
Center Case Study (Apr. 10, 2019). https://promarket.org/2019/04/10/selfregulation-and-the-video-game-industry-a-new-stigler-center-case-study/.
271
Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
272
Alex Gangitano, Video Game Group Pushes Back on Blaming Industry for
Shootings, THE HILL, (Aug. 6, 2019), https://thehill.com/business-alobbying/456326-video-game-group-pushes-back-on-blaming-industry-forshootings.
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absence of state regulation allows the federal government to
regulate loot boxes through the Commerce Clause.
In National Federation of Independent Businesses v.
Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Congress’ commerce
power is expansive, but limited to “activity.”273 The Court
examined the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act,
which compelled individuals to buy health insurance or receive a
penalty filed with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).274
Congress has the power to regulate commerce, but Congress
cannot compel commerce by requiring people purchase a
product.275 The Court found that the individual mandate compelled
individuals into the healthcare market by purchasing health
insurance, essentially regulating their inactivity as opposed to their
activity in commerce.276 Justice Roberts wrote that inactivity is
“divorced from any link to an existing commercial activity.”277
Thus, the power to regulate requires regulation of an existing
commercial activity.278
Congress’ authority to regulate existing commercial
activity still has an “expansive” reach over almost every product or
action in commerce.279 Congress’ authority even extends past
interstate commerce into activities that “have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce.”280 Congress’ authority to regulate extends
even further to activities that affect commerce, when those
activities aggregate with similar activities that affect commerce.281
Microtransactions would be considered an activity in
interstate commerce, since the transaction can take place from any
state using an online service.282 One example is Xbox Live, the
273

Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 551 (2012).
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 539–40.
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Id. at 552.
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Id. at 548.
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Id. at 556.
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Id. at 550.
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Id. at 536.
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Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 67 U.S. 519, 549 (quoting United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941)).
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Id. at 549 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)).
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The Unstoppable Rise of Online Gaming, ON: YORKSHIRRE MAGAZINE,
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online service for the Xbox console. Xbox Live provides the player
with an account that is connected to a credit card so that players
can conduct microtransactions within Xbox games.283 These
functions are performed through the Microsoft Store, a
marketplace for games and in-game content.284 Therefore,
Congress would have an existing commercial activity to regulate,
as console developers and other third-parties use online services to
act as markets for players to purchase loot boxes, virtual currency,
and other downloadable content from every state.

PART III: GAMBLING AND FEDERAL STATUTES
Next is an examination on the common law rules of
gambling and current federal statutes that tackle gambling. The
elements of the common law rules show how the courts may
examine claims regarding the video game industry’s business
practices toward microtransactions.285
Recall that gamers’
valuations of the contents in loot boxes was a key topic in the
debate amongst the FTC panelists when discussing whether loot
boxes were considered gambling.286 In exploring how these
concerns match current common law rules and the federal law, we
ultimately find that these rules are inadequate for addressing the
gaming/. (The transaction can be anywhere where the player uses a device to
enter into a microtransaction.)
283
XBOX, https://www.xbox.com/en-US/microsoft-store (last visited Apr. 13,
2020).
284
Id.
285
See Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., 886 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 2018)
(valuation of virtual currency in video games); Liston v. King.com, Ltd., 254 F.
Supp. 3d 989, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (in-game items had value, where loss of that
value amounted to a harm sufficient for standing).
286
FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER ISSUES
SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES (2020).(Mike Warneke comparing loot boxes to
baseball cards and scrips as one-to-one transactions; John Breyault stating that
price tags may not reflect the actual value the players are paying; Dr.
Elmachtoub stating that probabilities need regulation so players can get the
economic value out of traditional loot boxes; Anna Laitin, describing how
grinding as a design feature is built to make players value loot boxes as a low
cost alternative.)
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concerns for loot boxes.
A. Elements of Gambling
In most of the United States, gambling is generally defined as
“an event where someone risks something of value in the hopes of
winning a valuable prize based on the outcome of an uncertain
event.”287 The general definition breaks down into three core
elements: “consideration, chance, and a prize.”288
Consideration is determined by one of three theories: (1)
valuable consideration theory, (2) contract consideration theory, or
(3) promoter benefit theory.289 The most common theory in the
United States is valuable consideration theory.290 Under this
theory, a participant must give something of value to participate in
a prize event.291 States that apply this theory in their gambling laws
require that a game is pay-to-play and cannot have a free method
of entering the event.292 Contract consideration theory requires a
player to provide sufficient consideration to create a binding
contract.293 This theory has the lowest threshold for finding
consideration, as a mere change in position for a party is
sufficient.294 Promoter benefit theory requires that a promoter (of
an event or contest) receives a benefit of any kind to make a
finding of consideration.295
A game of chance is determined to be gambling through
one of three theories: (1) the Predominance test, (2) the Material
Element test, or (3) the Gambling Instinct test.296 The
Predominance test looks at chance and skill as a continuum and

ROBERT W. STOCKER, ET AL, 1 GAMING LAW & PRACTICE § 2.02 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2020 ed.).
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287.
293
Id.
294
Id.
295
Id.
296
Id.
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determines which characteristic dominates in a game or event.297 .
The Material Element test determines that if chance plays any
material role in a game or event, then the game or event is
considered gambling.298 The Gambling Instinct test determines a
game is gambling if a game or event appeals to someone’s
gambling instinct.299 Games determined to be gambling usually
have small amounts of consideration, long odds, and large
prizes.300 In some jurisdictions, these common law tests are
replaced with statutes that define gambling.301 The nature of loot
boxes places them within the reach of these theories, as even
representatives of the industry acknowledge the element of chance
in loot boxes.302
Prizes are deemed present “when a participant can win
something of marketable value in excess of the amount paid to
enter.”303 A prize’s marketable value and transferability are
important in determining digital objects as prizes.304 For example,
some courts have defined additional lives in arcade consoles as not
transferrable and therefore “not prizes for a gambling event
analysis” even though the digital objects were considered
marketable.305 Despite the arcade console promoter’s intention for
297

STOCKER, ET AL., supra note 287. (The Predominance test consists of two
paradigms: the “American Rule” and the “English Rule.” Determining whether
to use either paradigm for the Predominance test depends on the jurisdiction.
The “American Rule” uses the continuum to determine if a game or event is
gambling. The “English Rule” requires that a game involve only “pure chance”
to be considered gambling. An event or game that involves any amount of skill
will not be considered gambling.)
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299
Id.
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Cf. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INSIDE THE GAME: UNLOCKING THE CONSUMER
ISSUES SURROUNDING LOOT BOXES 46-48 (2020). (Warneke is making a
comparison of loot boxes to baseball cards, but the comparison requires a
description where the player is taking a chance that they will get a certain
reward. While there are a limited number of cards, the player is betting that the
odds are in their favor of getting the card they want.)
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Id.
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these digital objects not to have monetary value, the object’s
marketability provided monetary value.306 Companies that make
online casino games can avoid marketability issues by prohibiting
the transfer of free plays or extra play credits between players or
through other services.307
Ultimately, these common law theories do not provide a
definitive answer as to whether loot boxes can be regulated as
gambling. The variation in scope among each theory308 gives the
possibility that courts may be underinclusive when making a
holding on the status of loot boxes. For example, the valuable
consideration theory may not include loot boxes that are free309 but
require grinding to win, which, in the case of Star Wars Battlefront
II, was meant to incentivize players to choose the much easier
method of paying for loot boxes.310 On the other hand, the
promoter benefit theory could include these free loot boxes as
consideration because the prizes give a competitive advantage in
gameplay.311 Fulfilling the prize element leaves room for
interpretation as courts make different interpretations of what
defines market value and transferability.312 As seen with Counter
Strike: Global Defensive, the developers may create their own
valuations for items that players win, but the reality of third-party
sites creates an issue over which party has a more accurate
valuation of the item.313 If developers can argue that a player’s
winnings have no value, then the theory on prizes cannot provide a
remedy to regulate developers.314 Because common law theories
306

Id; contra, Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457 (D. Md. 2015)
(“But of course Plaintiff was not wagering with dollars; she was playing with
virtual gold. Plaintiff acquired that "gold" in the "gold store," where she
exchanged her real-world currency for a nontransferable, revocable license to
use virtual currency for entertainment purposes.”).
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308
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See Taylor Stanton Hardenstein, Comment, "Skins" in the Game: CounterStrike, Esports, and the Shady World of Online Gambling, 7 UNLV GAMING
L.J. 117, 121-22 (2017).
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on gambling may not give a conclusive answer to whether loot
boxes are gambling, federal regulation is needed.
B. Current Federal Statutes: The Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act
One way to understand how the federal government views
video games and gambling is to examine the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”), an Act addressing
problems concerning the interstate nature of digital transactions in
the Internet age.315 The UIGEA prohibits any person engaging “in
the business of betting and wagering” from accepting financial
instruments for unlawful internet gambling.316
First, the terms “bet” and “wager” should be looked at to
determine how the UIGEA defines gambling. The language in §
5362 (1)(A) defines the terms “bet” or “wager” as:
[T]he staking or risking by any person of something of
value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting
event, or a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or
understanding that the person or another person will receive
something of value in the event of a certain outcome.317
Also, in the UIGEA definition of “bet” and “wager,” there is
evidence that Congress adopted the Predominance test to define
the terms.318 In § 5362(1)(B), a purchase of a chance or
opportunity to win a prize is considered a “bet” or “wager” when
chance is the predominant factor to winning.319
Next, the UIGEA’s definition of “unlawful Internet gambling”
course Plaintiff was not wagering with dollars; she was playing with virtual
gold. Plaintiff acquired that "gold" in the "gold store," where she exchanged her
real-world currency for a nontransferable, revocable license to use virtual
currency for entertainment purposes.”).
315
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–
5366 (2020).
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
Id. § 5363(1)(B).
319
Id.
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provides an understanding of the contexts where an internet
transmission is considered gambling. The UIGEA defines
“unlawful Internet gambling” as:
[T]o place, receive, or otherwise knowingly transmit a bet
or wager by any means which involves the use, at least in
part, of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful
under any applicable Federal or State law in the State or
Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received,
or otherwise made.320
The UIGEA does not apply to intrastate gambling.321 It also
does not apply to activity that would fit the definition of “unlawful
Internet gambling” but is expressly authorized by the states where
the transaction is initiated and received.322
The UIGEA provides the necessary definitions and
verbiage for future regulations to control loot boxes as a form of
gambling. “Bets” and “wagers” apply the Predominance test in §
5363(1)(B), which is an appropriate theory to characterize the type
of event that occurs with a loot box because the outcome of
opening of a loot box is pure chance.323 Therefore, a loot box
would provide a chance to win a prize under § 5363(1)(B).324
The UIGEA definition of “Unlawful Internet gambling”
provides a template action for future regulations.325 All consoles
have their own networks that use the internet to facilitate
transactions between the player and the developer of the
console.326 Because loot boxes provide players with a chance to
win prizes, per the Predominance theory’s, purchasing loot boxes
through these networks would be similar to transmitting a “bet” or
“wager” under the definition of “unlawful Internet gambling.”327
320
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322
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While the UIGEA provides language regarding gambling
and its context with the internet and technology, the Act itself
cannot regulate loot boxes. The UIEGA did not make internet
gambling illegal,328 rather it made it illegal for banks to process
transactions made by United States residents with unlawful
gambling sites.329 Further, the UIGEA has lost much of its
authority through court reversals and the Justice Department’s
narrowing of the related Wire Act.330

PART IV: MODEL LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
Lastly, we come to our final option of federal regulation. As
examined previously, the federal government has the authority
under Murphy331 and Sebelius332 to regulate loot boxes. Federal
law and regulation can create a direct solution to loot boxes
whereas they might fall through the cracks of state common law on
gambling333 and the UIGEA.334 On May 23, 2019, Senator Hawley
introduced Senate Bill 1629 (“the Bill”) which was referred to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.335 The Bill
David J. Castillo, Note, Unpacking the Loot Box: How Gaming’s Latest
Monetization System Flirts with Traditional Gambling Methods, 59 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 165, 181 (2019). See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A).
329
Id.
330
Id. at 179-82. (“The Wire Act, through the Federal Communications
Commission's jurisdiction, empowers federal, state, and local law enforcement
agents to "discontinue, or refuse, the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of"
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provides a template for regulating the use of loot boxes in video
games.336 First, the Bill defines terms such as
“add-on
transaction,”
“minor-oriented
games,”
“pay-to-win
microtransaction,” and “loot box.”337 Second, the Bill tailors its
prohibition to sales aimed toward minors.338 Lastly, while the Bill
places the majority of regulatory authority with the FTC, the Bill
also provides a carve-out for a state enforcement mechanism.339
The Bill’s terms and definitions in Section 2 provide broad
regulatory targets for objects and entities.340 “Minor-Oriented
Games” are defined as an “interactive digital entertainment
product” for which the target audience is “individuals under the
age of 18.”341 The Bill gives a non-exclusive list of characteristics
in a game that can be evidence that the game is targeting
individuals under the age of 18, including: subject matter of the
product, visual content of the product, music and audio, use of
animated characters that appeal to children, age of characters in a
product, presence of celebrities under the age 18 or appeal to those
under the age of 18, language in the product, content in
advertising, empirical evidence of the audience, and other evidence
demonstrating the target is underage.342 Regulations based off this
standard should work alongside regulations to implement age
algorithms, as mentioned earlier, and to disclose data from these
algorithms.343
Add-On Transaction is defined in the Bill as:
[A] payment to the game publisher of an interactive digital
entertainment product, an affiliate of the publisher, or any
other person who accepts such payment for the benefit of
the publisher, of either money or an in-game proxy for
money, such as a virtual currency, that can be purchased
336
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with money, that-(i) unlocks a feature of the product; or
(ii) adds to or enhances the entertainment value of the
product.344
The inclusion of virtual currency in the definition addresses the
reality of in-game currency used as payment.345 In-game currencies
can possibly protect distributors and publishers from claims that
in-game currency has value based on transferability by placing in
the Terms of Use agreement that in-game currency cannot be
transferred.346 By leaving out any reference to transferability,347 the
law can make liable all distributors and publishers who use a proxy
for money in their games.348
“Pay-to-win microtransactions” are defined as a type of
add-on transaction that, from the perspective of a reasonable user,
the transaction would help ease progression, assist in
accomplishing an achievement, assist in receiving a reward, or
permit the user to continue to access content inaccessible due to a
limit placed to stop the player from continuing.349 “Pay-to-win
microtransactions” occur when, if only for the transaction, a user
gets a competitive advantage in a game that a reasonable user
would consider a competition with other users.350
The definition of “pay-to-win microtransactions” helps to
address situations such as with Star Wars Battlefront II, where the
developers made a system in which gaining experience provided a
free option to gain abilities to use in the multiplayer battles, but it
was nearly impossible to gain enough experience to get more cards
and maintain a competitive advantage.351 Therefore, players had no
344
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choice but to buy loot boxes in order to stay competitive.352 The
Bill also differentiates between downloadable content where
players know exactly what they’ll be getting, and add-on content
that urges players to make a purchase for the possibility of getting
a randomized reward.353
“Loot boxes” are defined as:
[A]n add-on transaction to an interactive digital
entertainment product that: (A) in a randomized or partially
randomized fashion: (i) unlocks a feature of the product; or
(ii) adds to or enhances the entertainment value of the
product; or (B) allows the user to make 1 or more
additional add-on transactions: (i) that the user could not
have made without making the first add-on transaction; and
(ii) the content of which is unknown to the user until after
the user has made the first add-on transaction.354
This definition of loot boxes is quite broad and encompasses all
gambling mechanics. The Bill also forecloses the option to argue
that skill represented a predominant factor in a game.355 The Bill’s
focus on existence of chance in the interactive digital product,356
rather than how much chance is involved in winning a prize,357
broadens the universe of products that the Bill can regulate.358
The Bill’s primary function is in Section 1, which contains
a prohibition against selling “pay-to-win microtransactions” and
“loot boxes” in “minor-oriented” games or when the distributor or
publisher “has constructive knowledge that any users are under age
18.”359 Section 1(a)’s prohibition targeting “minor-oriented” games
is useful for developing further legislation because it uses more
factors for determining if a game is for minors and does not purely
352
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rely on the ESRB rating of a game to determine what elements
make the game more oriented toward minors.360 Section 1(b)’s
standard for constructive knowledge would probably work
effectively with a statute that applies a duty of due care standard to
developers. With this standard, developers would have the burden
of proving that they did their best requisite research to make sure
minors did not play a game with microtransactions or loot boxes.
Lastly, the enforcement mechanism provides a scheme that
satisfies the anti-commandeering rule and the Commerce Clause.
The Bill does not give rise to anti-commandeering issues as
PASPA did in the Murphy case. Instead, the Bill gives State
Attorneys General the option to bring a civil action claim against
any person that violates the Act and bring them into an appropriate
State court.361 Indeed, Section 3(b)(3)(A)-(C) specifically note that
the statute is not to be construed to prevent the State Attorneys
General from exercising their state powers to: (A) conduct
investigations; (B) administer oaths or affirmation; or (C) compel
the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and
other evidence.362 Under this Bill, the only limits placed on a State
would be that the State would need to give written notice and a
copy of the complaint for the action to the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”)363 and to hold off during the pendency of
FTC action against any named defendant.364
This enforcement mechanism also places authority in the
correct agency. The FTC is instructed under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(2) to promulgate rules against unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce,365 while 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) empowers the
FTC to file an action against a person:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe
that any such person, partnership, or corporation [uses]
or [used] any unfair method of competition or unfair or
360
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deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and
if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the
public, it shall issue and serve upon such person,
partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its
charges in that respect and containing a notice of a
hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least
thirty days after the service of said complaint.366
Since this Bill regulates an interstate industry that engages in
economic activity, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the
authority to regulate it. As to the scope of the FTC’s authority, the
Bill lists prohibited business activities, so violators would be
engaging in an unfair business practice if they continued to sell
loot boxes to minors, and enforcement would be under the FTC’s
domain.367
Furthermore, the Bill treats the sale of loot boxes to minors
as a civil infraction which may be more appropriate as a tool to
disincentivize game developers than the current options, like
individual civil actions brought directly by video game players.368
The civil infraction proposed in the Bill does not target the
injury to the consumer, but rather the action of selling loot boxes to
minors.369 The Bill is stopping developers from receiving any
benefit that the company may receive from the sale at the time they
sold it.370 Also, having the FTC file the claim shifts regulatory
responsibility away from the consumer to the government as a
regulator of these developers.371
Senator Hawley’s proposed Bill would provide more
predictability for developers and publishers to plan their businesses
more accurately by understanding whom they can sell to. Also, the
Bill requires companies have constructive knowledge only to
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determine if a user is a minor.372 The Bill also sets out a clear
adjudicatory feature, in requiring the FTC to provide hearings for
defendants, where they are given the opportunity to show cause for
why the FTC should not enter an order against them.373 During
these hearings, developers can show that they have consumer
research, programs for detecting age, 374 or other types of evidence
that show they have reason to believe that the consumer was not a
minor.
CONCLUSION

The US federal government is capable of regulating loot boxes
and should follow the example set out by European nations.
Congress has authority to regulate the video game industry under
the Commerce Clause. Direct regulation of loot boxes and pay-towin microtransactions to a specific class of consumers would be
the most efficient method of enforcement, as seen in Senator
Hawley’s Bill where it tailors regulation to sales of loot boxes to
minors.
The Bill allows businesses to obtain revenue through the sale
of loot boxes and pay-to-win microtransactions to adults375 while
still protecting children, a class of consumers that are particularly
vulnerable and susceptible to maladaptive gambling behaviors.376
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The FTC workshop included a spectrum of opinion on varying
levels of regulation that showed the balance of interests between
business and consumers.377 Video game developers need revenue
to create more games, however children and other vulnerable
individuals need another level of protection in addition to selfregulation. While society wants companies to innovate and create
video games that expand the reaches of our imagination, regulators
should work to further mold the relationship between businesses
and consumers into one of mutual benefit, rather than one of
detriment to one side.
Recent discussions and government actions regarding loot
boxes are an indication of a growing concern for the potential for
harm that technology can have on children. The relationship
between behavior in children and loot boxes needs further study to
determine if loot boxes cause any future maladaptive behaviors
that can lead to gambling addiction. As technology advances and
becomes more of a part of our daily lives, our growing interactions
with it can normalize certain features which can have problematic
consequences in the future. Thus, this is an area that should
continue to be studied as technologies and corresponding
regulations develop.
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